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The traditional interpretation of corporate 
fi nance is characterized by ownership. 
Although, their rights are widely distributed 
among individual stockholders, but can be 
managed by few managers. Hence, confl ict 
of interest is arisen among managers and 
shareholders and this results in an agency 
problem (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 
1983). A number of empirical studies also 
confi rmed the ownership concentration of 
fi rms, especially those dominated by few large 
owners or block-holders (La Porta et al., 1999). 
The concentrated structure of ownership also 
contributes towards agency confl ict between 
block-holders and minority shareholders. 
From another perspective, the block-holders 
can benefi t minority shareholders by their 
role in monitoring managers and also can be 
hazardous if they strive to achieve their own 
private goals (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).
The three main aspects of ownership, 
which have been widely discussed in the 
past three decades, include concentrated 
ownership by block-holders, families and other 
groups, managerial ownership, and institutional 
ownership. The third aspect has gained 
importance as shareholding by institutional 
investors has increased in the US from 17% 
in 1970 to nearly 70% in the previous decade 
(Bushee & Noe, 2000). Meanwhile, in the case 
of Pakistan, nearly 25% of the common stock is 
owned by local and foreign institutional investors 
(Easterly, 2001). Institutional ownership is 
defi ned in the literature as the percentage of 
fi rm’s shares owned by institutional investors and 
it can also be defi ned as one minus percentage 
of shares held by individual investors (Firth et al., 
2016). Consequently, institutional investors play 
an effective monitoring role in the invested fi rms. 
Initially, early research mainly focused on the 
analysis of the relationship between concentrated 
ownership and fi rm performance (McConnell & 
Servaes, 1990; Duggal & Millar, 1999). Later on, 
the relationship between institutional ownership 
and different domains of corporate governance 
have opened additional research horizon, i.e. 
Karpoff et al. (1996), Johnson and Greening 
(1999), Mak and Li (2001).
Institutional investors have diverse 
preferences for the fi rms in which they invest. 
A number of studies carried out to determine 
the preferences of institutional investors in 
terms of fi rms’ corporate governance and 
other policies. Badrinath, Kale, and Ryan 
(1996) investigate the idea that institutional 
investors favor stocks that have higher market 
liquidity and lower return volatility. Others also 
confi rmed that institutional investors value the 
stocks of companies with superior disclosure 
(Bushee & Noe, 2000), those that would pay 
cash dividends or repurchase shares (Grinstein 
& Michaely, 2005), and also those demonstrate 
better managerial performance (Parrino et al., 
2003). Nevertheless, Cull and Xu (2005) have 
stressed the role of institutional investors in 
investment decisions, Grinstein and Michaely 
(2005) claimed the effects of dividend policy 
decisions and others in leverage or capital 
structure decisions (Bokpin & Arko, 2009; 
Chung & Wang, 2014). Most importantly, this 
study aims at determining the simultaneous 
effects of institutional ownership on fi rms’ 
strategic fi nancial decisions.
Thus, the interdependence of fi rms’ strategic 
decisions set a problem of endogeneity, leading 
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to a causal two-way relationship between 
them. Leverage or capital structure decisions 
are affected by dividend decisions and 
these choices also have an infl uence on the 
leverage decisions of a fi rm (Al-Najjar & Taylor, 
2008). However, studies have considered the 
endogeneity between institutional ownership 
and payout policy (Chang, Kang, & Li, 2016), 
ownership and fi rms’ value (Afza & Nazir, 
2015) and fi rms’ performance (Maquieira, 
Espinosa, & Vieito, 2011), this phenomenon 
seems to be particularly interesting in the case 
of the Pakistani, where the level of institutional 
ownership is high and considerable.
The main purpose of this study is to analyze 
relationships among institutional ownership 
and the fi rms’ strategic decisions relating to 
the leverage, the capital structure, dividend 
decisions and related investment decisions. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II 
highlights previous literature and proposes our 
hypotheses. Section III details the sample and 
research design used for analysis. Section IV 
includes the results of empirical examination 
and the discussion of its consequences. Section 
V concludes and highlights the importance of 
institutional ownership in fi rms’ decision.
1. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
Development
The agency theory suggests that optimal 
investors have a strong interest in monitoring 
fi rms’ management capital structure and 
ownership structure, which support fi rms to 
minimize their agency costs (Jensen, 1986). 
Agency costs are attributed to the arise confl ict 
of interest. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
identifi ed two main types of confl icts, i.e. 
confl icts of interest between the shareholders 
and managers, and confl icts between the 
shareholders and debtholders. Keeping 
managers’ absolute investment in fi rms’ 
constant, an increase in the ratio of debt 
fi nancing increases the managers’ share of 
equity and therefore, it reduces the loss from any 
confl ict between managers and shareholders. 
Moreover, since the debt requires the fi rm to 
pay out cash as a cost of debt, this reduces 
the amount of free-cash available to managers 
and in turn reduces the confl ict of interest. 
Previous literature on institutional ownership 
has proposed these solutions in order to gain 
benefi ts by enhancing fi rms’ value (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997). Nevertheless, institutional 
investors and debt can be substituted one 
another as an alternative for monitoring fi rms. 
This hypothesis is confi rmed by a number of 
empirical studies in the literature (Li, Yue, & 
Zhao, 2009). Consistently, agreeing with Al-
Najjar and Taylor (2008), we will propose that 
the relationship between institutional ownership 
and fi rms’ leverage can be expressed:
H1: The degree of stock ownership by 
outside institutions is negatively related to the 
leverage of the fi rms.
Since, Miller and Modigliani (1961) argued 
that dividend policy does not affect the value of 
the fi rm, different empirical studies have been 
conducted to investigate the dividend puzzle. 
Truong and Heaney (2007) also reported that 
the fi rms pay dividends and are inclined to pay 
more dividends when they have high levels 
of profi tability and low levels of investment 
opportunities. The classical agency theory 
perspective holds the view that fi rms are likely to 
share more of their profi ts with investors when 
they face lower monitoring costs (Jensen, 1986). 
It also holds that the largest shareholder may 
reduce agency costs by reducing the amount 
of free cash fl ow to managerial discretion by 
increasing fi rms’ payouts. Meanwhile, the 
literature provides some evidence on the 
relationship between institutional ownership 
and the dividend decisions of fi rms. Firth et 
al. (2016) and Short et al. (2002) confi rmed 
a positive correlation between institutional 
shareholding and the dividend payouts of fi rms. 
Grinstein and Michaely (2005) found a positive 
relationship between share repurchases and 
institutional holdings. According to their fi ndings, 
fi rms that repurchase more shares attract more 
institutional investments. Their results also 
suggest that institutional investors prefer fi rms 
that repurchase shares regularly. Based on this 
discussion, our second proposition regarding 
the relation between institutional ownership and 
dividend is the following:
H2: The percentage of stock ownership by 
institutional investors is positively related to the 
dividend payment of the fi rms.
Bushee (1998) demonstrates that the 
short-term focus of many institutional investors 
induces some fi rms to reduce R&D when 
earnings are expected to decline. On the basis 
of the investment horizon and preferences, 
institutional investors are classifi ed as 
‘transient institutions’, highlighted managers’ 
myopic behavior. The other two types of these 
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institutions are ‘dedicated 1 and ‘quasi-indexer’ 
institutions. These institutional investors have 
stable ownership in fi rms and are less focused 
on short-term earnings. The relation between the 
investment decisions of fi rms and institutional 
ownership as proposed in the literature is not 
so straightforward. However, investment is one 
of the most important aspects through which 
institutional owners can affect a fi rm. A positive 
relation between investment and ownership was 
confi rmed by Pindado and Torre (2006), whereas 
Richardson (2006) reports that managers of 
fi rms with large institutional ownership are less 
likely to overinvest surplus cash, due to the 
monitoring governance activities of institutions. 
Considering Bushee’s (1998) myopic investor 
hypothesis to be more relevant in the context of 
Pakistani institutional investors (in terms of the 
short-term horizon and lack of information), the 
relationship is proposed as,
H3: The percentage of stock ownership by 
institutional investors is negatively related to 
the investment of the fi rms.
Debt and dividend can substitute or 
complement one another in reducing agency 
costs. These kinds of strategies auxiliary well 
if convergence of interest is strong (Rozeff, 
1982). If the entrenchment hypothesis of 
Farinha (2002) is effective these decisions 
are complement. Believing on this, our study 
proposes a negative relation between leverage 
and dividends.
H4: The leverage of the fi rm is negatively 
related to the dividend.
Some early studies examined how fi rms’ 
optimum debt preference affects investment 
decisions. Smith and Warner (1979) argued 
that debt can bound a fi rm’s ability to employ 
an asset substitution, while Berkovitch and 
Kim (1990) discuss that project fi nance and 
secured debt support to resolve investment 
incentive problems. Hackbarth, Hennessy 
and Leland (2007) indicated that placing 
bank debt at the top of the fi rm’s priorities 
fully exploits tax shield benefi ts of interests. 
Studying interactions between investments 
and fi nancing decisions, they examined the 
idea that a dynamic trade-off between priority, 
capital structure and investment incentives 
yields important additional insights and further 
empirical predictions. Based on the literature 
we assumed that:
H5: Leverage is negatively related to fi rms’ 
investment decisions.
However, the investment of fi rms also 
affects their dividend policy decisions. 
The relationships among the dividend and 
investment decision policies are evidenced 
from the theoretical background of Miller and 
Modigliani (1961). This theory argues that in 
a perfect capital market, optimal investment 
decisions by a fi rm are independent of how 
such decisions are fi nanced. This core theory 
has also an important outcome as investment 
decisions should not be determined by 
dividends, and dividend decisions need not 
be affected by investment decisions. In this 
perspective, Fama (1974) provided empirical 
evidence of violence to this theorem. Since 
then, there is no evidence for an existed relation 
between dividend and investment decisions 
that require treating them via simultaneous 
equations models (SEM). For those fi rms 
which have great investment opportunities, 
payment of dividends must be balanced with 
the long-term goals of fi rms (Myers & Majluf, 
1984). Crutchley et al. (1999) found a negative 
two-way relationship between dividend and 
investment decisions. An increased dividend 
can lead to reduced funds available for 
investment and hence results in a decreased 
dividend probability for the future (Cyert et al., 
1996). Hence, we can also assume that:
H6: The dividend is negatively related to the 
investment decisions of fi rms.
Our corresponding hypothesis regarding 
the relation among institutional ownership and 
leverage, dividend and investment decisions 
are summarized in Fig. 1.
2. Sample and Research Design
The data used for this study is comprised 
of a sample taken from non-fi nancial fi rms 
listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSE). 
Total statistics of this study include all listed 
fi rms in 33 different sectors. A sample of 170 
fi rms belonging to eight different sectors were 
considered for analysis between 1994 and 
2014. The selection of the sample depends 
upon the availability of all the required data. 
Financial fi rms, fi rms with negative equity and 
fi rms whose relevant data is incomplete or 
not available are excluded from this sample. 
Moreover, our analyses are based on annual 
frequency of data, in order to align fi nancial 
statements results and institutional ownership 
variables. In this study, a sectoral approach is 
also used, following King and Santor (2008).
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The variables extracted from the Balance 
Sheet Analysis (BSA) publication of the State 
Bank of Pakistan (SBP) (2018) include capital 
structure decisions captured by the following 
factors:
 leverage (LEV), which measured by debt to 
equity ratio (Hassan & Butt, 2009),
 dividend payouts (DPO), as the ratio of 
dividend per share to earnings per share 
(Afza & Nazir, 2015),
 investment decisions (INV) measured 
by the ratio of Change in Fixed Assets to 
Total Assets in place of R&D expenditures 
(Jensen et al., 1992),
 Return on Equity (ROE), as the ratio of net 
income to shareholders’ equity (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003),
 size of fi rm (Size) equals with the natural 
logarithm of the book value of total assets 
is used (Lin & Chang, 2011),
 tangibility (TANG) of assets is measured as 
the ratio of fi xed assets to the total assets of 
fi rm (Liu et al., 2011),
 Sales growth (Sales_GR) is calculated as 
the annual percentage change in sales of 
a company (Lin & Chang, 2011),
 age of fi rm (Age) is defi ned as the log of 
number of years elapsed since a fi rm was 
listed (Roy, 2015),
 institutional ownership (INST), as the 
percentage of shares owned by institutional 
investors of the total number of shares 
outstanding (Michaely & Vincent, 2013). INST 
is taken from annual reports of individual 
companies, reported under the Code of 
Corporate Governance of Pakistan (CCGP),
 and the dividend decisions of fi rms are 
captured by dividend yield (DY), as the ratio 
of the dividend per share to market price 
per share (Bradford et al., 2013).
In the method identifi ed for this study, there is 
a potential causality or endogenous relationship 
among leverage decisions, dividend decisions 
and investment decisions. A simple ordinary 
least square (OLS) estimation to capture the 
relationship among these variables will create 
biased and inconsistent estimates, as given 
by (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Hence, there 
is a need to explore a more sophisticated 
econometrics technique for analysis. There are 
different ways to address the issue of biased 
and inconsistent estimates. One of them is 
2SLS, the others are 3SLS and GMM. 3SLS 
has advantages over 2SLS, as with the former 
to capture cross equation impacts of error terms 
and the system of equation is supposed to be 
correlated in 3SLS (Zellner & Theil, 1962).
Fig. 1: The interrelation framework among institutional ownership and strategic leverage, dividend and investment decisions of fi rms
Source: own based on the author’s assumptions
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This study is based on the 3SLS methodology 
in order to analyze the simultaneous 
determination of fi nancial decisions and their 
possible two-way causality. 3SLS is always 
preferred in term of the inherent effi ciency of its 
estimates over 2SLS (Kapteyn & Fiebig, 1981). 
3SLS is the most appropriate technique for this 
data set if a system estimator is considered 
rather than one equation. This method is 
designed to capture a relation where equations 
in a model have endogenous variables as 
exogenous. Since some of the explanatory 
variables are endogenous variables, the error 
terms of the equations are correlated, which 
simply violates the assumptions of Ordinary 
Least Square (Baltagi, 2008).
In order to analyze the impact of institutional 
ownership on various strategic decisions of 








where leverage (LEV), dividend yield (DY) and 
investment (INV) are dependent variables in 
these equations, showing a possible causality 
(two-way) relationship among them, since they 
also appear on the right side of the equation as 
exogenous variables. (e) represents the error 
terms for the equations 1, 2 and 3, and they 
are also assumed to be correlated. ROE, Size, 
TANG, Sales_GR, Size and Age are additional 
control variables in these equations, as offered 
Bokpin and Arko (2009); Chang et al., (2016).
In order to confi rm the robustness of our 
results, the above equations are specifi ed with 
some dummy variables for capturing the cross 
industry-effects (Truong & Heaney, 2007). 
Industry specifi c dummies are combined with 
the formal Code of Corporate Governance of 
Pakistan in 2002, and all listed companies in 
Pakistan should follow a full representation to 
the CCGP. Considering the time effects, various 
year dummies are also added to account for the 
impact of institutional ownership and strategic 
decisions over time.
3. Empirical Analysis and Results
Tab. A.1 reports in Appendix the descriptive 
statistics of all variables. This table reports 
the mean or average value, the standard 
error of the mean, the median, the standard 
deviation, skewness and kurtosis for 1,502 
observations. The mean or average value of 
LEV is 1.69 with a standard deviation of 1.48. 
Leverage value is higher and it shows a greater 
reliance of fi rms listed in the PSE on external 
sources of fi nancing, as reported earlier by 
Afza and Nazir (2015). Thus, the average value 
of INV is .006%, with a standard deviation of 
.00046. The average institutional ownership 
in Pakistani fi rms is reported as 32.14% of 
total shares outstanding with a standard error 
of 0.63. Nevertheless, in order to check the 
heteroscedasticity, various White tests are 
applied. The results of these tests are reported 
in Tab. A.2 (Panel A) and the chi-square values 
confi rm the presence of heteroscedasticity 
in our model. Panel B also the probability of 
test statistics confi rms the presence of serial 
correlation. The correlation between the 
variables (Tab. A.3) for the sample selected is 
analyzed using the Pearson correlation. The 
result shows a positive correlation between 
institutional ownership and dividend yield. Thus, 
institutional ownership shows a slight negative 
correlation with leverage, whereas it seemed 
no correlation with investment.
The following Tab. 1 reports the corresponding 
results after 3SLS analysis of each models. The 
outcomes lead to the following implications. 
In model 1, the coeffi cient of dividend payouts 
(DPO) ratio (-0.711) is also negative and 
signifi cant at one percent. This confi rms the 
simultaneous determination of dividend and 
leverage. Consequently, we also claimed that 
fi rms use leverage and dividend as alternative 
monitoring devices. In other words, fi rms paying 
higher dividends fi nd debt a less attractive source 
of fi nancing (Ogden & Wu, 2013). Moreover, 
fi rms with higher fi nancial costs are not ready to 
pay dividends. A higher fi rm leverage will lower 
the potential dividend payout to shareholders 
(Truong & Heaney, 2007).
The leverage of fi rms (LEV) is negatively 
related to institutional ownership and the result 
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is highly signifi cant. This result shows that 
institutional owners, regardless of their type, 
are hesitant to invest substantial stakes in 
fi rms that are highly leveraged. This negative 
and signifi cant relationship also supports 
the argument that institutional owners may 
act as a substitute for the monitoring role of 
debt in the capital structure of fi rms (Moh’d 
et al., 1998; Chung & Wang, 2014). In this 
perspective, the reluctance of institutional 
owners to invest in highly leveraged fi rms 
may be due to their intention to avoid risk 
(Crutchley et al., 1999).
The profi tability of a fi rm is also negatively 
related to the fi rm’s leverage, and the coeffi cient 
is signifi cant at 95%. This result is in line with 
the pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 
1984), suggesting a negative relation due to 
the reliance of fi rms’ internally generated funds. 
Essentially, fi rms’ size has a positive role in 
determining the level of leverage. Consequently, 
bigger fi rms are more leveraged than smaller 
ones. The sales growth has positive and 
signifi cant results, as claimed Al-Najjar and 
Taylor (2008). These fi ndings contradict agency 
theory, supporting the negative relation between 
Variables LEV (Model 1) DY (Model 2) INV (Model 3)
Constant 1.3430***  -0.00467  -0.0001  
 SE -0.3358  -0.0093  -0.0001  
INV -0.0009  -0.0000    
 SE -0.0010  0.0000    
LEV   -0.00010  0.0000  
 SE   -0.0002  0.0000  
DY     0.0000  
 SE     -0.0005  
DPO -0.711*** -0.711*** 0.0744*** 0.0744***   
 SE -0.1402 -0.1402 -0.0039 -0.0039   
INST -0.0041*** -0.0041*** 0.0008* 0.0008* -0.0003  
 SE -0.0014 -0.0014 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001  
ROE -0.0154*** -0.0154*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** -0.0000  
 SE -0.0016 -0.0016 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
Size 0.1827*** 0.1827*** -.00006  -.0000  
 SE -0.0261 -0.0261 -0.0007  0.0000  
SALES_GR 0.0017** 0.0017** 0.0000  0.0000*** 0.0000***
 SE -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0001  0.0000 0.0000
TANG -0.4372*** -0.4372*** 0.0022  0.0001** 0.0001**
 SE -0.1808 -0.1808 -0.0050  -0.0001 -0.0001
Age -0.2489  0.0142*** 0.0142*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
 SE -0.1857  -0.0051 -0.0051 0.0000 0.0000
Adj. R-squared 0.1030 0.3213 0.0580
Chi-Sq. 172.29*** 710.87*** 92.70***
Hausman Test Statistics: Chi-Sq.= 1.41, Prob.>Chi-Sq.= 0.9941
Source: own based on (State Bank of Pakistan, 2018) and author’s own calculations
Note: *** denotes 1%, ** 5% and * 10% level of signifi cance. SE is robust standard error. Model 1, 2 and 3 corresponds 
to equations 1, 2 and 3 respectively.
Tab. 1: Results of 3SLS Regressions Based on Equation 1, 2 and 3
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ownership and growth due to fact that growing 
fi rms tend not to transfer their wealth to creditors. 
Thus, tangibility has a negative and signifi cant 
relationship with leverage. The negative relation 
can be attributed to the presence of institutional 
or block-holder ownership which results in 
closer ties with lenders, thus reducing the need 
for more collateral (Deesomsak et al., 2004).
The results of second models highlight 
that the coeffi cient of investment (INV) and 
debt (LEV) with dividend is although negative, 
but insignifi cant in our models. Thus, the 
coeffi cients of institutional ownership (INST) 
are positively and signifi cantly correlated with 
dividend yield (DY). The reason for increased 
dividend levels can be the role of institutional 
shareholder voting rights for higher dividends 
to enhance managerial monitoring (Farinha, 
2002). Thus, one unit increase in profi tability 
ratios increased the level of dividends. This 
supports that more profi table fi rms with ceteris 
paribus higher levels of institutional ownership 
tend to pay more dividends than the less ones 
(Truong & Heaney, 2007). Examining the 
signifi cant control variables, only Age shows 
a positive and substantial coeffi cient at 1%. 
These fi ndings consistent with the fi ndings 
of Thanatawee (2012) regarding the fi rms’ 
tendency of paying increased dividends.
Nevertheless, the relationship of institutional 
ownership (INST) and the fi rm’s investment (INV), 
as suggested by the third model, is negative. 
Although the result is statistically insignifi cant, 
the negative coeffi cient is in accordance with the 
fi ndings of Richardson (2006). The short term 
focus of institutional investors may constrain the 
manager to reduce investment (Bushee, 1998) 
to avoid mispricing caused by disappointed 
institutional investors’ selling.
The positive and signifi cant relation 
between age and investment variables also 
provides support for the same proposition. 
The coeffi cient of tangibility is signifi cant and 
positive, indicating that capital-intensive fi rms 
are still in the process of expansion. The same 
phenomenon is confi rmed by the signifi cant 
and positive relationship between sales growth 
and investment. The results indicate high sales 
growth requires the fi rm to place more money 
in expansion or project/production facilities. 
This consequence corresponds to the fi ndings 
of Jensen et al. (1992). However, there is no 
evidence for simultaneity in dividend and 
investment decisions of fi rms, but results are 
seemed to consistent with the fi ndings of Fama 
(1974).
Tab. 2 demonstrates the results of 
simultaneous equations where industry specifi c 
dummies are incorporated into the model. The 
omitted control dummy variable represents 
Engineering, which becomes a reference for 
all other industries. All the reported results 
remain the same in terms of their sign and 
signifi cance, with some exceptions. The 
coeffi cient of age in the fi rst leverage (LEV) 
model becomes signifi cant after the addition 
of dummies. In other words, one unit increase 
in age of fi rms seemed to decrease debt to 
equity ratio. Therefore, ageing fi rms are less 
levered in Pakistan. Thus, the negative impact 
of institutional ownership on fi rms’ leverage 
becomes more pronounced after including 
industry specifi c dummies. Overall results are 
consistent with both analyses, suggesting that 
the specifi cations of our models are robust. 
The explanatory infl uence of the models has 
also increased after including industry specifi c 
variables.
Variables LEV (Model 1) DY (Model 2) INV (Model 3)
Constant 1.104*** -0.0180* -0.00006
 SE -0.3623 -0.0101 -0.0001
LEV -0.00007 -0.0000
 SE -0.0002 0.0000
INV -0.0006 0.0000
 SE 0.0010 0.0000
DY -0.0005
 SE -0.0006
Tab. 2: Results of 3SLS Regressions with sectoral dummies (Part 1)
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Variables LEV (Model 1) DY (Model 2) INV (Model 3)
DPO -0.5715*** -0.5715*** 0.0820*** 0.0820***
SE -0.1447 -0.1447 -0.0040 -0.0040
INST -0.0044*** -0.0044*** 0.0001** 0.0001** -0.0000
SE -0.0015 -0.0015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ROE -0.0147*** -0.0147*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** -0.0000
 SE -0.0016 -0.0016 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Size 0.2043*** 0.2043*** -0.0000 -0.000005
 SE -0.0286 -0.0286 -0.0008 0.0000
SALES_GR 0.0016* 0.0016* 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000***
 SE -0.0009 -0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
TANG -0.4607** -.4607** 0.0002 0.0001*** 0.0001***
 SE -0.1902 -0.1902 -0.0053 -0.0001 -0.0001
Age -0.3422* -0.3422* 0.0135** 0.0135** 0.0053* 0.0053*
 SE -0.1919 -0.1919 -0.0054 -0.0054 -0.0001 -0.0001
CHEM -0.1604 -.00431 0.0000
 SE -0.1609 -0.0045 -0.0001
CONS -0.2422 -0.0018 -0.0001* -0.0001*
 SE -0.2012 -0.0056 -0.0001 -0.0001
PAPER 0.1432 0.0036 -0.000015
 SE -0.2423 -0.0068 -0.0001
ENERGY 0.3315 0.0036 -0.0000
 SE -0.2067 -0.0058 -0.0001
FOOD 0.5973*** 0.5973*** 0.0112** 0.01120** -0.0001** -0.0001**
 SE -0.1606 -0.1606 -0.0045 -0.0045 -0.0001 -0.0001
PERSONAL 0.3197** 0.3197** 0.0170*** 0.0170*** -0.0000
 SE -0.1469 -0.1469 -0.0041 -0.0041 0.0000
MISC -0.6593*** -0.6593*** 0.0063 -0.0000
 SE -0.2168 -0.2168 -0.0061 -0.0001
Adj. R-squared 0.1479 0.3486 0.0711
Chi-Sq. 260.66*** 803.53*** 112.85***
Hausman Test Statistics: Chi-Sq.= 1.31, Probability > Chi-Sq.=1.00
Source: based on (State Bank of Pakistan, 2018) and author’s calculations
Notes: *** denotes 1%, ** 5% and * 10% level of signifi cance. SE is robust standard error. Models correspond to the 
equations (1, 2 and 3) after incorporating industry dummies respectively. CHEM is chemical industry; CONS is constructi-
on and material industry; PAPER is paper & board industry; ENERG is fuel and energy sector; FOOD is food producer 
industry; PERSONAL is personal goods industry and MISC is miscellaneous industries.
Tab. 2: Results of 3SLS Regressions with sectoral dummies (Part 2)
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Essentially, additional time dummies are 
added to capture the effects of particular years 
affects the dividend equation. As a result, the 
size of fi rms (Size), the sales growth (SALES_
GR) and tangibility (TANG), which were 
previously insignifi cant, are substantial with 
the dividend model now, as reported in Tab. 3. 
Namely, if the sales growth is increased more 
dividends seemed to pay for stockholders. 
However, if there is one unit increase in size 
and tangibility of fi rms less disbursement are 
purchased to the owners. These results are 
similar with (Lin & Chang, 2011) fi ndings.
Generally, our results in the case of LEV 
and INV have less changed and remained 
insignifi cant in the second and third tables, 
suggesting the robustness of the results. 
Adjusted R-squared values for DY and INV 
have increased, as well. At the bottom of each 
reported tables are the appropriated adjusted 
R-squared and Chi-square values. Moreover, 
additional Hausman tests are also reported 
at each table regarding 3SLS analysis. These 
statistics are performed to analyze the expected 
difference between the coeffi cients using 2SLS 
and 3SLS methods. The reported values of them 
are 1.37, 1.39 and 0.69 respectively. These 
coeffi cients are insignifi cant in all models, and 
indicating no signifi cant difference between the 
two models for particular sets of system (Baltagi, 
2008). Previous studies (Chang et al., 2016) 
also confi rmed that the presence of outliers 
affects the overall explanatory power of the 
examined model. This 3SLS method applied 
on the ‘winsorized’ dataset to eliminate the 
effect of extreme values results in inconsistency 
(Wilson, 1993). After removing these outliers, 
the results recently show improved explanatory 
power. However, general conclusions are given 
only if further determinants will be taken in to 
consideration to determine their effects on fi rms’ 
strategic decision-making. Therefore, the validity 
of our results is limited by the bias caused by the 
exclusion of the omitted variables of our models.
Variables LEV (Model 1) DY (Model 2) INV (Model 3)
Constant 0.7010* 0.0442*** -0.0006***
 SE -0.3699 -0.0096 -0.0001
LEV 0.0001 -0.0000
 SE -0.0002 0.0000
INV -0.0011 0.0000
 SE -0.0010 0.0000
DY 0.0004
 SE -0.0006
DPO -0.8026*** -0.8026*** 0.0759*** 0.0759***
 SE -0.1401 -0.1401 -0.0036 -0.0036
INST -0.0049*** -0.0049*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** -0.0000
 SE -0.0015 -0.0015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
ROE -0.0152*** -0.0152*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** -0.0000
 SE -0.0017 -0.0017 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Size 0.2131*** 0.2131*** -0.0026*** -0.0026*** -0.0000
 SE -0.0267 -0.0267 -0.0007 -0.0007 0.0000
SALES_GR 0.0008 0.0000** 0.0000** 0.00000*** 0.00000***
 SE -0.0010 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
TANG -0.610 -0.0097** -0.0097** 0.0001** 0.0001**
 SE -0.1819 -0.0047 -0.0047 -0.0001 -0.0001
Tab. 3: Results of 3SLS Regressions with time dummies (Part 1)




This research paper addresses an emerging 
dimension of fi rms’ ownership; regarding 
institutional ownership and its interaction with 
major strategic fi nancial decisions, including 
leverage, dividend and investment decisions. 
Institutional ownership includes equity 
ownership by institutional investors, such as 
banks, insurance companies, mutual and 
pension funds, and investment trusts. Previous 
literature supports the strong incentive of 
institutional investors to infl uence the fi rms’ 
fi nancial decisions. The main result of this 
study supports the expected negative relation 
of institutional ownership and a fi rm’s leverage 
decisions and a positive relation with a fi rm’s 
dividend decisions.
Furthermore, the relationships among 
various strategic decisions differ in terms of the 
magnitude of effect and sensitivity. Dividend is 
a determinant of leverage decisions (provided 
by the negative and signifi cant coeffi cient), but 
leverage is not a simultaneous determinant of 
dividend or investment decisions. Consequently, 
Variables LEV (Model 1) DY (Model 2) INV (Model 3)
Age 0.1129 -0.0092* -0.0092* 0.0001** 0.0001**
 SE -0.1973 -0.0051 -0.0051 -0.0001 -0.0001
Y04 0.0810 -0.0109** -0.0109** 0.0006*** 0.0006***
 SE -0.1914 -0.0050 -0.0050 -0.0006 -0.0006
Y05 0.0741 -0.0112** -0.012** 0.0006*** 0.0006***
 SE -0.1919 -0.0050 -0.0050 -0.0001 -0.0001
Y06 0.1136 -0.0143*** -0.0143*** 0.0005*** 0.0005***
 SE -0.1961 -0.0051 -0.0051 -0.0001 -0.0001
Y07 -0.0017 -0.0160*** -0.0160*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
 SE -0.1884 -0.0049 -0.0049 -0.0001 -0.0001
Y08 -0.0189 -0.0138*** -0.0138*** 0.0005*** 0.0005***
 SE -0.1923 -0.0050 -0.0050 -0.0001 -0.0001
Y09 -0.0534 0.0088* 0.0088* 0.0004*** 0.0004***
 SE -0.1961 -0.0051 -0.0051 -0.0001 -0.0001
Y10 -0.2063 0.0242*** 0.0242*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
 SE -0.2000 -0.0052 -0.0052 -0.0001 -0.0001
Y11 -0.1574 0.0212*** 0.0212*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
 SE -0.1988 -0.0052 -0.0052 -0.0001 -0.0001
Y12 -0.5385** -0.5385*** 0.0273*** 0.0273*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
 SE -0.1956 -0.1956 -0.0051 -0.0051 -0.0001 -0.0001
Y13 -0.644*** -0.644*** 0.0134*** 0.0134*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
 SE -0.1959 -0.1959 -0.0051 -0.0051 -0.0001 -0.0001
Adj. R-squared 0.1250 0.4243 0.1288
Chi-Sq. 214.43*** 1,106.98*** 226.05***
Hausman Test Statistics Chi-Sq.= 0.69, Probability > Chi-Sq.=1.00
Source: based on (State Bank of Pakistan, 2018) and author’s own calculations
Notes: *** denotes 1%, ** denote 5% and * denotes 10% level of signifi cance. SE is robust standard error. Models corre-
spond to the equations (1, 2 and 3) respectively. 3SLS is applied using dummies to check robustness at the examined 
years.
Tab. 3: Results of 3SLS Regressions with time dummies (Part 2)
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high leverage fi rms pay lower dividends. These 
results can be aligned with the fi ndings of 
Jensen et al. (1992).
The negative and signifi cant correlation 
between institutional ownership and leverage 
also confi rms that institutional investors prefer 
low leveraged fi rms. Firms that aim to attract 
institutional investors for effective monitoring 
should consider this factor when choosing debt 
fi nancing. The signifi cant positive relationship 
between institutional ownership and fi rm 
dividend decisions suggests a preference 
among institutional investors for dividend-
paying fi rms, as compared to fi rms do not 
pay stable dividends. Since, this study has 
not able to fi nd signifi cant two-way relations 
between institutional ownership and investment 
decisions, institutional investors rather focus 
on corporate governance and internal control 
of fi rms. Indeed, institutional investors should 
develop their governance role in order to 
improve the effi ciency of fi rms’ management 
and governance. These investors play the 
same role as a ‘watch dog’ for companies, 
so fi rms should prefer institutional owners 
of their stocks. Besides, the presence of 
institutional investor monitoring the fi rms’ better 
business performance (Rajnoha, Lesníková, & 
Krajčík, 2017). These fi ndings have important 
implications for the future theoretical research 
in the fi eld of strategic management in general 
and corporate governance in particular.
The limitation of this study is that it focuses 
on the effects of institutional ownership on 
strategic decisions of fi rms listed in one 
Pakistani case. However, this study has future 
research potential to consider other emerging 
markets. Thus, the source of data has some 
limitations that should be kept all into mind while 
making such analysis (Sutopo, Kot, Adiati, & 
Lina Nur Ardila, 2018).
Moreover, we concentrated on one 
type of business ownership i.e., institutional 
ownership. Our research can be further 
extended by considering insider ownership, 
family ownership and block-holder ownership, 
i.e. (Ahmad, Oláh, Popp, & Máté, 2018). 
Hence, it is worth to redesign it by incorporating 
country specifi c factors, such as political and 
economic environment and global factors, i.e. 
economic crashes, natural disasters, along with 
fi rm specifi c factors, for improved results.
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Appendix
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
LEV 1.697 1.482 -2.940 7.28
DY 0.0362 0.0474 0 0.333
INV 0.00006 0.00045 -0.0036 0.0038
INST 32.1481 24.73 0 95.51
ROE 17.592 24.406 -98.44 132.47
Size 7.8312 1.4473 2.2727 12.74
TANG 0.5108 0.215 0.0045 1.434
SALES_GR 13.010 38.595 -98.793 313.76
Age 1.346 0.1999 0.6989 1.806
DPO 0.1933 0.2785 -0.4416 1.5244
LAG_INV -1.5810 35.62 -493.38 598.31
LAG_LEV 0.2627 4.199 -5.2656 156.95





Dependent Variables LEV DY INV  
Test Statistics Prob. Prob. Prob.
F-statistic 6.692 0.00 3.223 0.00 10.620 0.00





F-statistic 565.86 0.00 206.93 0.00 3.782 0.023
R-Squared 647.63 0.00 326.16 0.00 7.578 0.0226
Durbin-Watson 0.6990 1.0780 1.84993
Source: own based on (State Bank of Pakistan, 2018) and author’s own calculations
Tab. A.1: Descriptive statistics of the variables
Tab. A.2: Tests of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelations
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DY LEV INV INST ROE Size TANG S_GR Age DPO
DY 1
LEV -0.21*** 1
INV -0.05* 0.055** 1
INST 0.062** -0.048* -0.013 1
ROE 0.380*** -0.23*** -0.019 -0.006 1
Size 0.108*** 0.094*** 0.094 0.15*** 0.20*** 1
TANG -0.171*** 0.047* 0.045* 0.009 -0.23*** 0.03 1
S_GR 0.063** 0.011 0.22*** 0.009 0.165*** 0.11 -0.022 1
Age 0.092*** -0.04 0.042 -0.014 0.094*** 0.036 -0.17*** 0.01 1
DPO 0.511*** -0.174 -0.029 .061** 0.310*** 0.15*** -0.23*** -0.003 0.02 1
Source: own based on (State Bank of Pakistan, 2018) and author’s own estimations
Note: Correlation is signifi cant * at 0.10 level, ** at 0.05 level, *** at 0.01 level
Tab. A.3: Correlation matrix of the examined variables
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Abstract
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND SIMULTANEITY OF STRATEGIC FINANCIAL 
DECISIONS: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS IN THE CASE OF PAKISTAN STOCK 
EXCHANGE
Rabeea Sadaf, Judit Oláh, József Popp, Domicián Máté
The traditional interpretation of corporate fi nance is characterized by ownership rights are widely 
distributed among individual stockholders, but can be managed by few managers and resulted in 
an agency problem. The primary objective of this research study is to investigate the relationship 
between institutional ownership and fi rms’ strategic decisions. These strategic decisions include i.e. 
leverage, dividend and investment decisions. The examined data is used from 170 non-fi nancial 
Pakistani listed fi rms, characterized by a large percentage of institutional investors, with a multiple 
equity stake in different fi rms across a wide fi eld of industries. This study is also able to show two 
important novelties. Firstly, the fact that previous researchers have already concentrated on the 
impact of institutional ownership on individual strategic decisions, as dividend or leverage policies 
and several unanswered questions remain. Consequently, the impact of institutional ownership 
has explored collectively on various strategic decisions. Secondly, this study also recognizes the 
determination of strategic decisions by considering the endogeneity problem with a Three-Stage 
Least Square (3SLS) method. Essentially, the effects of institutional ownership on fi rms’ leverage 
becomes more pronounced after including industry specifi c and time dummies in regression models. 
Based on the results, the case of increased institutional ownership of fi rms has a signifi cant negative 
effect on leverage, and a positive effect on dividend decisions. Hence, institutional investors are 
seemed to prefer low leveraged and high dividend-paying fi rms. Moreover, this study has not able 
to fi nd signifi cant two-way relations between institutional ownership and investment decisions, so 
institutional investors rather focus on corporate governance and internal control of fi rms. Indeed, 
institutional investors should develop the effi ciency of fi rms’ management to support more adequate 
corporate governance policies, and not only for emerging markets.
Key Words: Strategic decisions, endogeneity, institutional ownership, 3SLS.
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